The Trump administration’s concept of the “Indo-Pacific” should be placed in the context of the main strategic aims of his administration: to preserve the world primacy of the US and to prevent a strong China from displacing the US in Asia.
With the exception of its attempt to get North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons, the US’ Asia policy is mostly about China, or more accurately, what other countries can do to help it win its struggle with China for dominance in the region.
ASEAN states’ unwavering support of the “ASEAN Way,” characterized by the making of consensus in tackling regional issues, probably suggested that they maintained a prudent and pragmatic diplomatic posture towards China, in between firm rebalancing and full endorsement.
The Xiangshan Forum, one of East Asia’s premier security forums, is being held in Beijing from October 24 to 26, 2018. What has attracted the attention of international observers is Pyongyang sending a delegation led by two heavyweights.
The strategic move of restructuring China’s arm forces is aimed at building a joint battle system and strengthening joint command ensuring the People’s Liberation Army’s capability of “fighting and winning battles and effectively safeguarding China’s national security.”
While the debt issue is definitely a major obstacle to some projects, it is not detrimental to the Belt and Road Initiative. In order to address this problem, China has strengthened cooperation and policy coordination with the BRI states and made some progress on it.
The articles by Gordon Chang in response to Lyle Goldstein’s posted in the National Interest contain several inappropriate innuendos. One of Chang’s statements is: “Wars start because aggressors read articles like Lyle Goldstein’s and think they can take what they want.”
Recently a number of stories have appeared in the Western liberal media pushing the narrative that US President Donald Trump despises both China and the Chinese people. These are useful to the Democratic Party going into an election in November 2018.
Many analysts are looking at the disaggregated July US imports from China because changes in the July importation figure of the affected items are the first tangible data points of how the Chinese exports to the US have been affected.